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Is Informality Bad? 
Evidence from Brazil, Mexico and South Africa
* 
 
The informal sector plays an important role in the functioning of labor markets in emerging 
economies. To characterize better this highly heterogeneous sector, we conduct a 
distributional analysis of the earnings gap between informal and formal employment in Brazil, 
Mexico and South Africa, distinguishing between dependent and independent workers. For 
each country, we use rich panel data to estimate fixed effects quantile regressions to control 
for (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity. The dual nature of the informal sector emerges 
from our results. In the high-tier segment, self-employed workers receive a significant 
earnings premium that may compensate the benefits obtained in formal jobs. In the lower end 
of the earnings distribution, both informal wage earners and independent (own account) 
workers face significant earnings penalties vis-à-vis the formal sector. Yet the dual structure 
is not balanced in the same way in all three countries. Most of the self-employment carries a 
premium in Mexico. In contrast, the upper-tier segment is marginal in South Africa, and 
informal workers, both dependent and independent, form a largely penalized group. More 
consistent with the competitive view, earnings differentials are small at all levels in Brazil. 
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The existence of large informal sectors in developing countries has often been cited as a
central factor underlying wage inequality, persistent poverty and labor market ine¢ cien-
cies. According to the traditional view (Fields, 1975, Dickens and Lang, 1985), salary
workers enter informality to escape unemployment or because they are rationed out of
the formal sector as a result of an overly regulated labor market. They earn less than
identical workers in the formal sector ￿wages in the latter are set above market-clearing
prices because of minimum wages, higher unionization or e¢ ciency-wage explanations.
In a similar way, (informal) self-employment is seen as a means of overcoming economic
hardships in developing countries (Leibenstein, 1968), and several authors report that on
average the self-employed earn less than workers in paid employment (e.g., Aronson, 1991,
Carrington et al., 1996, Sullivan and Smeeding, 1997). Some authors have recently ques-
tioned this paradigm, arguing that an important fraction of informal jobs may re￿ ect the
voluntary choice of workers given their preferences, skill endowments and competing earn-
ings prospects. Evidence has been particularly compelling for Latin America, pointing
to better earnings prospect in self-employment than in paid (formal) employment (e.g.,
Maloney, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2004, Yamada, 1996, Saavedra and Chong, 1999, among
others).
In this context, accurate measures of earnings di⁄erentials across sectors represent an
important aspect of the analysis of labor markets in developing countries. While earnings
equalization should eventually occur in competitive labor markets, persisting earnings
gaps may re￿ ect compensating di⁄erentials across sectors, e.g., social security bene￿ts in
the formal sector, tax avoidance, independence and job ￿ exibility in self-employment.1
Hence earnings gaps across sectors do not allow testing directly the hypothesis of seg-
mentation on the labor market, but may nonetheless provide useful information (see the
discussion in Maloney, 1999). When undertaking this type of analysis, however, the most
di¢ cult problem may be the huge heterogeneity of the informal sector. Some studies
￿nd no signi￿cant earnings di⁄erences on average between formal paid workers and the
self-employed (Arias and Khamis, 2007) or between formal and informal salary workers
(Badaoui et al., 2008). Yet comparisons at the mean may conceal important di⁄erences
1Implicit gains for informal salary workers are less obvious. Yet one may see informal jobs as a
labor market entry point and a training area for young workers, or a type of employment with more
￿ exible hours for married women. Workers in informal employment also avoid taxes/social security
contributions while possibly attaching a low value to formal sector bene￿ts, either because these services
are traditionally provided through family support or because workers may be aware of ine¢ ciencies in
formal social protection.
1along the earnings distribution ￿or may not characterize the returns of the majority
of informal sector workers if a handful of prominent entrepreneurs push up the average
earnings (see the discussion in Hamilton, 2000). Also, recent labor market modeling
suggests adopting a dual representation whereby a competitive/voluntary entry informal
sector, often associated with self-employment (cf., Arias et al, 2005), coexists with a ra-
tioned/segmented group (Funkhouser, 1997, Blunch et al., 2001, Maloney, 2004, Fields,
2005).2 While such a representation is convenient for modeling purposes, the informal
earnings gap may change gradually along the earnings distribution or with workers￿at-
tributes, and the size and nature of these high- and low-tier segments remains an open
empirical question.
The present paper suggests an attempt to capture the diversity of the informal sector
by estimating earnings gaps along two main dimensions. Firstly, we carefully distinguish
between informal self-employment, informal salary work and formal salary work. We
estimate the earnings penalties/premia carried by the two ￿rst states, using formal sector
wage earners as the reference point.3 Secondly, to depart from estimations of the mean
earnings gap, we use quantile regression techniques and unveil more complex patterns
from which the lower-tier and upper-tier informal segments of the labor market can be
characterized.
More speci￿cally, we focus on three countries which have received a lot of attention
in the literature on informality, namely Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. De￿ning infor-
mality in the most comparable way across countries, we exploit large (rotating) panels to
account for workers￿unobserved heterogeneity. That is, we estimate ￿ ￿xed e⁄ects￿panel
regressions at di⁄erent points of the earnings distribution as suggest by Koenker (2004)
and Canay (2008). The dual nature of the informal sector, with upper and lower-tier seg-
ments, emerges from our results. In the upper part of the distribution, self-employment
carries a signi￿cant premium that may compensate the bene￿ts obtained in formal jobs,
while the wage gap between formal and informal salary workers tends to disappear. In the
lower end, both independent (own account) workers and informal wage earners face earn-
ings penalties vis-￿-vis the formal sector. Interestingly, the dual structure is not balanced
2Several interesting studies show that the dual representation of the informal sector proves to be a
better alternative than polar models (see in particular Cunningham and Maloney, 2001, and G￿nther
and Launov, 2006).
3Some studies consider in turn the comparison between formal and informal salary workers and between
the latter and independent workers (e.g., Arias and Khamis, 2008, Bosch and Maloney, 2007). Some other
studies focus exclusively on formal versus informal salaried work (see our companion paper Bargain and
Kwenda, 2009, and Badaoui et al., 2008, among others). At the other extreme, some studies approximate
informality by self-employment (for instance Yamada, 1996, for Peru).
2in the same way in all three countries. While most of the self-employed workers receive
a premium in Mexico, possibly very large at the top of the distribution, the upper-tier
segment is marginal in South Africa. Informal workers, both dependent and independent,
form a largely penalized group in this country. More consistent with the competitive view,
earnings di⁄erentials are small at all levels in Brazil.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y presents the labor markets in the
three countries under study and the related literature on informality. Section 3 describes
the data, the selection and the identi￿cation of informality. The econometric approach
is detailed in section 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and reports robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Informality in Brazil, South Africa and Mexico
The question of informality has received a lot of attention in the literature. A large
amount of evidence is summarized in Leontaridi (1998), Perry et al. (2007), J￿tting et
al. (2007), Ru⁄er and Knight (2007), among others. Many speci￿c references for Brazil,
South Africa and Mexico are to be found in these surveys and throughout the present
paper. In this section, we simply provide a brief background description for each country.
The Brazilian labor market is characterized by stringent labor legislation and has
experienced a series of economic crises. These two factors are often blamed for the high
rates of informal paid workers, which account for approximately 30% of urban employees,
and a growing self-employment (Moro et al., 2003).4 Carneiro and Henley (2001) and
Menezes-Filho et al. (2004) show that for some workers, the informal sector may be a
desirable form of employment in Brazil; they also ￿nd that the large informal wage gap can
be explained by selection bias and consequently favor the competitive markets hypothesis.
This view seems to be supported by studies on sectoral mobility. Barros et al. (1990)
￿nd high mobility rates between sectors in the Sao Paulo region while Ru⁄er and Knight
(2007) argue that there cannot be segmentation if there is such free mobility between
sectors. In contrast, other studies report evidence of signi￿cant earnings di⁄erentials ￿
4Noticeably, the constitutional changes of 1988 have led to an increase in labor costs, a reduction
in hours worked and a more relaxed role of trade unions (Barros and Corseuil, 2001, Bosch et al.,
2007). Concerning macroeconomic crises, alternating periods of recession and high in￿ ation may have
contributed to the expansion of the informal sector, which accounts for 87% of the jobs created between
1992 and 2002. Also, trade liberalization in the early 1990s must have put some pressure on the tradable
good sector, resulting in large movements of labor out of the (formal) manufacturing sector and into the
informal part of the service sector, with relatively contained unemployment (Hoek, 2007).
3that may favor the segmentation hypothesis ￿in the lower part of the earnings distribution
(Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2002).
Evidence is relatively clear for Mexico. Maloney (1999) reports that moves into (out
of) self-employment are associated with signi￿cant increases (decreases) in earnings whilst
moves from informal salaried work are associated with increases in earnings. Studying
mobility patterns across business cycles, Bosch and Maloney (2007, 2008) con￿rm that
a substantial part of the informal sector in Mexico (and Brazil), particularly the self-
employed, likely corresponds to voluntary entry while informal salaried work may corre-
spond more closely to the standard queuing view, especially for younger workers. Gong
et al. (2004) ￿nd that entry and exit rates for the formal sector are lower than for the
informal sector; the probability of formal sector employment increases with the education
level, possibly in response to higher returns to education attached to formal jobs. Gong
and van Soest (2002) con￿rm this view, suggesting that the dual structure is supported
for highly educated workers but not for low-educated ones.
South Africa is somewhat di⁄erent from Latin American or other African countries.
The presence of unemployment and the relatively small size of the informal sector are
partly on account of the potential barriers to entry ￿or hidden costs ￿in informal em-
ployment for those who are unemployed (Chandra et al., 2002). These are due in particular
to land/credit constraints, inhibition of entrepreneurial skills resulting from the apartheid
era and high crime rate against business owners (cf., Devey et al., 2003, Fields, 2006).
Another reason, which rather applies to salary workers, is that reservation wages may
be higher in South Africa compared to lower income countries. The unemployed who
receive some support from within or beyond the household may prefer to remain outside
the low-tier informal sector where real income is very low (Kingdon and Knight, 2001).
Evidence regarding the involuntary nature of the informal sector is mixed, however. Sev-
eral authors point toward sharp segmentation between the formal and informal segments
of the labor market (Hofmeyr, 2002, Kingdon and Knight, 2007), highlighting the role of
trade unions, collective bargaining and labor standards in ￿ registered￿employment. In-
formal sector wages, being more subject to market forces, are about 60% lower according
to Kingdon and Knight (2007). Yet some dynamic segments of the informal labor market
also exist according to some studies. For the region of KwaZulu-Natal, Valodia et al.
(2006) and Cichello et al. (2005) ￿nd that, for many workers, the informal sector has
generated more employment and shown faster wage progression in the 1990s.
43 Measuring the Raw Earnings Gap
3.1 Data, Selection and Informality De￿nition
For Brazil, we make use of the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Em-
prego, PME) conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geogra￿ae Estatistica (IBGE). This
is a monthly household survey on the six largest metropolitan areas of Brazil (i.e., Belo
Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Sao Paulo). Households
are interviewed four months in a row and re-interviewed eight months later for another
four months. We create a panel with observations that are a year apart, focusing on
years 2002 to 2007. For South Africa, we use the labor Force Survey (LFS), a bi-annual
rotating panel conducted by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) and covering all provincial
areas. Twenty percent of the sampling units are rotated out of the survey and replaced
with a new sample every six months; workers are therefore observed ￿ve times at most
over a two-and-a-half year period. We use the waves of September 2001 to March 2007.
For Mexico, we use the Mexican National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE)
conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geographica e Informatica (INEGI).
This is a quarterly survey where workers are observed at most ￿ve times over a ￿ve-quarter
period. We use data from the ￿rst quarter 2005 to the third quarter 2008.
These surveys provide information about job characteristics, incomes, work duration,
demographics and education. Since households are identi￿ed over time but individuals
are not, we construct panels of individual workers by linking persons within households
over time on the basis of gender, race and age. For the baseline estimates, we select
workers that are observed at least twice in the data. The attrition resulting from this
procedure corresponds to 30% of the initial sample for Brazil, 19% for South Africa and
17% for Mexico. In the last section, we check for possibly non-random attrition that
could bias our results. We restrict our sample to urban men aged 15 to 65 years, not
engaged in any form of education, and in full time employment in the private sector. We
focus on men because in all three countries a large proportion of women are not active
or are engaged in unpaid work ￿accounting for selection into the labor market is not
yet standard in quantile estimations (see Albrecht et al., 2004). We select only workers
in the private sector, which excludes unpaid family workers (whose implicit earnings
are di¢ cult to evaluate) and public sector employees; for the latter, there are indeed
important di⁄erences in institutional mechanisms regulating wages, both across countries
and compared to the private sector.
We opt for the legalistic/social protectionist de￿nition of informality which refers to the
5lack/avoidance of formal registration, taxation and labor standards and the lack of social
security protection. This de￿nition is important for welfare considerations as informal
sector workers may experience earnings penalties on top of "bad" work conditions (e.g.,
no social protection). This is also a broader concept of informality as it recognizes the
possible presence of unregistered/unprotected workers in large ￿rms (Perry et al., 2007).5
More speci￿cally, the group of informal salaried workers is identi￿ed on the basis of
lack of compliance with labor legislation, which is relatively straightforward to capture in
the surveys at use. In Mexico employees have to contribute to the social security agency
(IMSS). Similarly, employees in Brazil must hold a labor card (carteira assinada), the
signing of which guarantees them access to formal labor protection. Therefore those wage
employees not registered with the social security agency in Mexico or not holding a signed
labor card in Brazil are consider as informal salaried (similar de￿nitions are used for in-
stance in Amuedo-Dorantes, 2004, Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2002, Bosch and Maloney,
2007, 2008). For South Africa, the LFS contains several questions regarding fringe ben-
e￿ts and other aspects of the job that can be used to identify the sector, in particular
questions regarding whether the ￿rm provides medical aid and deducts unemployment
insurance contributions (see also Badaoui et al., 2008).
The group of independent or self-employed workers also belongs to a large extent to
the informal sector as de￿ned above or as characterized by the ILO. For Brazil, self-
employed do have the legal obligation to pay social security contributions and Henley et
al. (2006) report that around 95% do not do so. A relatively small group of self-employed
in Mexico (less than 6% of all self-employed in our survey) satisfy the IMSS registration
although under no legal obligation to do so. As in Bosch and Maloney (2008), we treat
them as formal sector workers and drop them from the sample. In South Africa, although
self-employed workers can make contributions to social security, we ￿nd that only 3% do
so. The data allows us to identify those owners of a registered ￿rm and who pay taxes
(19:5% of all self-employed). Those who are registered/pay taxes or make social security
contributions are excluded from our sample. As a further check, we ￿nd that very few
self-employed workers own ￿rms of more than ￿ve employees (15% in Brazil, less than
5% in Mexico and 10:5% in South Africa). Note that we also check the validity of the
self-reported employment state with relevant information for each country.6
5ILO traditionally recommends classifying informal as workers in small establishments of fewer than
5-10 employees, who tend to be informal along di⁄erent dimensions. Henley et al. (2006), Perry et al.
(2007) and Bosch and Maloney (2008) show there is substantial overlap in these de￿nitions. We have
checked this for the datasets at use and ￿nd that it is broadly the case, except for Brazil where we found
many informal (unregistered) salaried workers in large ￿rms ￿see Bargain and Kwenda (2009) for more
details.
6For instance, holding a working permit in Brazil should only apply to those in paid employment. We
6This selection leaves an unbalanced panel of 22;186 men with 44;372 observations
in Brazil; 9;237 men with 22;757 observations in South Africa and 107;465 men with
363;911 observations in Mexico. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 and discussed
below. We categorize workers in one of the three states, namely self-employed, formal and
informal paid work. Self-employment accounts for 34% of total employment in Brazil,
10% in South Africa and 26% in Mexico. Informal salary work accounts for 12% of total
employment in Brazil, 11% in South Africa and 33% in Mexico.
3.2 Earnings and Sample Description
We construct a measure of hourly earnings for all workers, using monthly gross earn-
ings and reported work hours in the primary job. For the self-employed, information on
monthly earnings does not allow distinguishing between returns to labor and to capital ￿
we discuss this point in the concluding section. Earnings are adjusted over time using the
national consumer price indices provided by the IBGE, Stats SA and the Central Bank
of Mexico.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for Brazil, South Africa and Mexico and table
2 completes the description of the samples by reporting the estimates of a multinomial logit
of the workers￿states (the reference is formal salary worker). In line with previous studies,
we show in table 1 that self-employed workers earn more on average than wage earners in
Latin America but earn less than formal salaried workers in South Africa. Other things
being equal, self-employed workers are substantially older in Latin America and informal
paid workers tend to be younger than all other workers in all three countries, which is
consistent with the view that informal salaried work acts an entry point into the labor
market. Another standard result is that highly educated workers are more concentrated
in formal employment and, to a lesser extent, in self-employment. Figure 1 plots the
proportions of workers￿types in each decile of the pooled sample. All employment states
are represented in all deciles but only formal sector employees are spread relatively equally
over the earnings distribution. Informal paid workers are mainly concentrated in the lower
end while self-employed workers are more often in the upper tails in Mexico and Brazil
and in the lower deciles in South Africa.
drop the few self-employed worker who declare having such signed labor card (3:4% of them), interpreting
it as an indication of misclassi￿cation. For South Africa, we use a question on whether a worker runs
his/her own business. The marginal fraction declaring not to have their own enterprise is excluded from
the sample. Data also allows distinguishing between owners of ￿rms (i.e., employers) and individual inde-
pendent workers (i.e., own account workers). Hence, we verify that own account workers are consistently
located in ￿rms of size equal to one (errors are of an order less than 1%).
74 Econometric Approach
We ￿rst estimate standard Mincer earnings equations at the mean and at various quan-
tiles using pooled years data for each country. Explanatory variables comprise standard
human capital information (age, age squared, education) and other individual/household
characteristics as reported in table 1 (race, number of children, marital status, region) as
well as broad industry dummies to control for the possible structural di⁄erences between
sectors.
Next, we rely on (unbalanced) panel data to identify time-invariant unobserved het-
erogeneity. We ￿rst estimate a ￿xed e⁄ects model (FE) for each country and compare
the result to standard OLS. We also extend this approach to the whole distribution by
estimating ￿xed e⁄ects quantile regression (FE-QR), to be compared to the results of the
standard quantile regression (QR). Denote Iit (resp. Sit) a dummy taking value one if
person i observed at time t is informal salary worker (resp. self-employed). Denote xit
a set of controls, ￿i the time-invariant heterogeneity (the individual ￿xed e⁄ect) and "it
an i.i.d. normally distributed stochastic term accounting for possible measurement error.
The FE model is simply written:
yit = ￿i + ￿t + xit￿ + ￿Iit + ￿Sit + "it
where E ["it j￿i;xit;Iit;Sit] = 0 for all individuals i and periods t. The FE estimator is
consistent even if unobserved characteristics are correlated with both selection and earn-
ings, as long as those characteristics are constant over time. The estimated coe¢ cients
b ￿ and b ￿ are interpreted as a measure of the conditional earnings premium/penalty expe-
rienced by informal salary workers and self-employed workers respectively, compared to
formal wage earners. These conditional earnings gaps are derived from the comparison
between those who move between employment states and the ￿ stayers￿ . Denote C = 1;2;3
the three di⁄erent states, respectively self-employed, informal salary workers and formal
salary workers. Let us illustrate the identi￿cation by a simple two-period example and
three of the possible cases:
E [yi2 ￿ yi1jCi1 = k;Ci2 = k] = ￿ for k = 1;2;3
E [yi2 ￿ yi1jCi1 = 1;Ci2 = 3] = ￿ ￿ ￿
E [yi2 ￿ yi1jCi1 = 2;Si2 = 3] = ￿ ￿ ￿
with ￿ = ￿2 ￿ ￿1 + (xi2 ￿ xi1)￿
The change in earnings for those moving into formal employment and coming from self-
employment (second line) or informal salary work (third line) contribute to identify the
8premium/penalty of the two latter states compared to formal sector remunerations, to-
gether with the stayer of all types (￿rst line). Identi￿cation is completed by the movers
obtained by all the other possible permutations between states. Note that at this stage,
we do not account for possible di⁄erences in the earnings gaps whether it is identi￿ed on
workers moving from formal to informal sectors or on those moving in the other direction,
but allow for asymmetrical e⁄ects in the last section.
The extension of the standard QR model to longitudinal data goes as follows. For any




yit (￿ j xit) = ￿i + ￿t(￿) + xit￿(￿) + ￿(￿)Iit + ￿(￿)Sit, 8￿ 2 [0;1]:
Fixed e⁄ects ￿￿ s have a pure location shift e⁄ect on the conditional quantiles of the
response (i.e., they a⁄ect all quantiles in the same way). We can use Koenker (2004)￿ s
approach to estimate this model or the alternative and simpler approach suggested by
Canay (2008). The latter exploits the assumption that ￿ terms are pure location shifters,
so that they can be estimated in a ￿rst step by traditional mean estimations (for instance
by OLS estimator in ￿rst di⁄erences). Then it is possible to use the estimated b ￿i in order
to regress corrected earnings b yi = yi ￿ b ￿i on the other covariates by traditional QR.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Main Results
Our main results are represented in ￿gures 2, 3 and 4 and commented below. For each
country, we report the estimated coe¢ cient b ￿ and b ￿, i.e., the earnings penalties/premia
from informal salary work and informal self-employment compared to the formal sector.
The left panel of each graph shows the estimates from OLS and QR on pooled years
while the right panel depicts the estimates of the FE and FE-QR on panel data. Dashed
lines and empty diamonds represent the bootstrapped 95% con￿dence intervals. For each
country, we can see that QR (resp. FE-QR) estimates are not all contained in the interval
surrounding the OLS (resp. FE) coe¢ cient and reveal important di⁄erences along the
earnings distribution. In table 3, we also report the earnings penalty at the mean, the
median and two extreme quantiles as well as the bootstrapped standard errors.7
For Brazil, OLS estimates indicate that on average self-employed workers receive an
earnings premium of 11% compared to formal sector wage earners, while informal salary
7The full estimation tables, not reported because of space limitation, are available from the authors.
9workers face a mean penalty of 9%. The left panel of Figure 2 shows a more complex
pattern, revealing that the self-employed workers face a moderate penalty in the bottom
of the distribution but a premium in the upper 75%, which increases with earning levels.
The informal sector penalty for salary workers is decreasing with the earning levels, i.e.,
it is signi￿cant at the bottom (around 15%) but disappears at the top. Results in the
right panel show that when accounting for ￿xed e⁄ects, the penalty for informal salary
workers decreases by around a third. The self-employment premium decreases by around
10 points in the upper half while the penalty at the bottom increases slightly ￿signi￿cant
penalties for self-employed workers now concern the ￿rst half of the distribution. Thus, it
appears that formal salary workers have "better" unobserved skills than informal sector
counterparts in the ￿rst half of the distribution but "worse" unobserved characteristics
than self-employed workers in the second half.
For South Africa, we ￿nd an average informal sector penalty of around 62% for salary
workers and 30% for self-employed. The left panel of ￿gure 3 shows little variation along
the earnings distribution for the former group but a decreasing penalty with earning levels
for the latter, turning into a premium at the top. When accounting for unobserved het-
erogeneity, the earning penalty faced by both dependent and independent workers of the
informal sector decreases at all levels and especially in the lower part of the distribution,
with a drop of 20 ￿ 30 percentage points. Independent workers of the top quarter of
the distribution receive a moderate premium while the penalty faced by informal salary
workers decreases with earnings levels and tends to vanish at the top.
Results of pooled QR for Mexico are relatively similar to what is found in Brazil,
with a premium of around 13% on average for self-employed workers and a penalty of
around 15% for informal salary workers. The left panel of ￿gure 4 shows that for both
types of worker, the earnings di⁄erential to formal employment increases with earnings
levels. When accounting for ￿xed e⁄ects, the self-employed premium increases slightly
(up to 16% on average) and the penalty faced by informal salary workers becomes very
moderate. The self-employment premium, very large at the top, is observed at all points
of the distribution except the lower 15%.8
8Very similarly, Cunningham and Maloney (2001) report that 13% of the self-employed workers are
in the lower-tier informal sector, using cluster analysis techniques and de￿ning lower- and upper-tiers on
the basis of the capital intensity per worker, earnings, hours worked, ￿rm life, and education.
105.2 Discussion and Additional Results
Most interestingly, results above show a similar pattern in all three countries. Firstly,
time-invariant unobservables are an important factor behind the observed earnings gaps,
even after controlling for a rich set of characteristics. Secondly, formal salary workers
have "better" unobserved skills than informal dependent and independent workers in
all three countries, with the exception of independent workers in Brazil. Thirdly, when
controlling for unobservables, it appears that the upper-tier segment of the informal sector
is comprised of self-employed workers and is the most rewarding type of employment of
all. In contrast, the lower end of the earning scale is mainly composed of informal salary
workers and, to some extent, of self-employed workers that we examine below.
Fundamental di⁄erences across countries appear in the relative size of each segment,
mostly re￿ ecting the speci￿c nature of independent employment in the three countries
under study. Mexico and South Africa can be seen as two polar cases while Brazil lies
somewhere in-between. Self-employment appears to be a desirable segment of the Mexican
labor market, dominating salary work, both formal and informal, at almost all points of
the earnings distribution. This is line with previous studies and conveys that there may
be a ￿ Mexican exception￿(Maloney, 1999, Gonzalez and Maloney, 1999, Marcouiller et
al., 1997). In contrast, the upper-tier segment is marginal in South Africa and earnings
penalties for both dependent and independent workers in the informal sector can be
substantial, certainly too large to be justi￿ed by compensating di⁄erentials. This is
consistent with the traditional view that formal employment is the desirable outcome
in this country and that informal sector workers may su⁄er from segmentation (Kingdon
and Knight, 2001, 2007, Hofmeyr, 2002, Ru⁄er and Knight, 2007). This is also in line
with the fact that unemployment is a frequent substitute to informal employment for those
queuing for formal jobs. More consistent with the competitive view, earnings di⁄erentials
are small at all levels in Brazil.
In the rest of the paper, we focus essentially on self-employed workers ￿a detailed
analysis of the informal salary workers is conducted in Bargain and Kwenda (2009). To
complement the results above, we pinpoint the independent workers at the two ends of
the distribution. For each country, we estimate a multinomial logit on the sub-sample of
self-employed, with three categories de￿ned as the bottom segment (0:1 ￿ 0:2 quantiles
of the pooled sample), the middle segment (0:3 ￿ 0:7 quantiles) and the top segment
(0:8 ￿ 0:9 quantiles). Our estimated coe¢ cients refer to the probability of being located
at the top or the bottom of the earnings distribution relative to the middle segment, used
as the reference group. Table 4 shows that independent workers located at the bottom of
11the distribution in Mexico and Brazil are more likely to be own account workers, young,
with primary or no education and in service work or elementary occupations. For these
two countries, those at the top are more often employers (￿rm owners, as opposed to own
account worker), older and with higher education. These patterns are much less clear in
South Africa.
The FE-QR model simply uses dummy variables for informal salary work and self-
employment, and may be seen as misspeci￿ed. While it is well known that, in case of
misspeci￿cation, least square regression provides a minimum mean squared error linear
approximation to the true functions, Angrist et al. (2006) provide a similar result for
quantile regression. Therefore our ￿ndings have meaningful interpretation even if the
true informal wage penalty depends on the covariates. Nonetheless, we can examine
the heterogeneity of the informal earnings gaps by simply interacting the informal sector
dummies with workers￿age and education levels. Results are reported in the panel A
of ￿gure 6 for the self-employment penalty/premium. It shows that the between-group
variation is not important compared to within-group heterogeneity (i.e., the variation
of the earnings gap along the distribution) in Mexico. Variation in age and education
can a⁄ect the earnings premium/penalty more signi￿cantly in the other countries. In
particular, having low education increases the penalty by 3 ￿ 7 points in the ￿rst half of
the distribution in Brazil, and being a younger worker (age 25) increases the penalty by
16 ￿ 20 points in the ￿rst half in South Africa.
5.3 Robustness Checks
The identi￿cation of FE on movers is standard but one must verify that the number of
moves across sectors is large enough for a valid use of this estimator. We calculate the
proportion of all panel transitions (i.e., all pairs of observations for the same workers)
that correspond to a move. We ￿nd that 5%, 8% and 10% of all transitions are moves
between formal and informal salary work (either ways) for Brazil, South Africa and Mex-
ico respectively, which correspond to 1;117, 1;088 and 25;028 movers respectively. Moves
between formal salary work and self-employment represent 4%, 4% and 3% of all tran-
sitions, corresponding to 807, 500 and 6;650 movers respectively. These are reassuring
numbers regarding the possibility to identify the parameter of interest.9
We also check that movers are not too speci￿c. Firstly, one may expect that cross-
sector moves are limited to speci￿c groups of workers, for instance those with the least
9Note that the identi￿cation of the earnings gaps is completed by the moves between informal salaried
workers, which correspond to 5%, 3% and 9% of all transitions respectively.
12earnings who are in search of better job prospects. In this case, our estimates could be
biased. Figure 5 depicts the proportion of movers per quintiles of the "initial" earnings
distribution, i.e., using the periods where workers are ￿rst observed in the pooled sample.
This picture shows that moves are relatively spread over the whole distribution in Brazil
and South Africa, although a larger number of moves between formal and informal salary
work occurs at the bottom. The high frequency of moves in Mexico (around 20% of all
panel transitions) occurs at all earnings level ￿even if moves between formal sector and
self-employment are more frequent in the upper part. This overall picture is reassuring
since moves are not overly concentrated in some parts of the earnings scale.10
Another aspect of the identi￿cation strategy that merits discussion is the assumption
that the earnings penalty is the same for those that move from the informal sector to the
formal sector as it is for those that move in the opposite direction. If all the unobservable
heterogeneity is time-invariant, as assumed in the FE estimator, then this is not an issue.
However, with the traditional view of self-employment as a safety net for those losing
preferred formal sector jobs, one would expect that moves into informal self-employment
are more often the result of time-speci￿c negative shocks (e.g., productivity shocks), and
that moves in this direction capture larger penalties (or smaller premia) than moves in
the opposite direction. We replicate our results when including only one type of move at a
time. Graphs in panel B of ￿gure 6 show that results are not fundamentally asymmetrical.
Finally, we check that panel attrition does not lead to some bias by selecting out a
speci￿c type of workers. Indeed our baseline estimation excluded all workers observed
only once in the data. However, it might be expected that workers in the informal sector
are more likely to exit from the panel because of higher migration or higher misreporting.
To check for possible non-random attrition, we simply estimate QR on pooled years for
those observed only once in the data and compare the estimated earnings gaps to baseline
results. The panel C of ￿gure 6 shows that results are very similar in both cases, conveying
that sample attrition does not relate to labor market states.
6 Concluding Discussion
Using large panel data for Brazil, South Africa and Mexico, we estimate the conditional
earnings gaps between formal and informal sectors along the earnings distribution, distin-
10We refrain from drawing any conclusions based on these ￿ raw￿transitions. A more in-depth interpre-
tation of inter-sector ￿ ows would require some adjustments for turnover and job creation as performed
in Bosch and Maloney (1997) and Maloney (1999), which is naturally beyond the scope of the present
paper.
13guishing informal wage earners from self-employed workers. Time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity seems to play an important role in explaining the earnings di⁄erentials,
even after controlling for a rich set of characteristics. A consistent result across countries
is that informal salaried workers are to a large extent the least paid group in the urban
workforce. The lower-tier segment of the informal sector is also composed of young and
unskilled own-account owners. The earnings penalty faced by these groups is moderate
in Latin America but very large in South Africa, in line with the traditional view. The
upper segment of the informal labor market is composed of ￿rm owners in all three coun-
tries, who fare better than formal sector workers at the top of the earnings distribution.
Yet this segment is marginal in South Africa while most of the entrepreneurs in Mexico
receive earnings premia. More consistent with the competitive view, earnings di⁄erentials
are small at all levels in Brazil.
We conclude with a series of comments on the present approach. Firstly, we have
used panel information to purge our estimations from time-invariant unobservable hetero-
geneity. Extending the approach to time-varying unobservables would require to model
selection explicitly. Yet it seems extremely challenging to ￿nd proper instruments, i.e.,
instruments that can convincingly explain selection into a given sector (but not earn-
ings) and that also vary over time. Secondly, as in many studies, we have compared
self-employment income to formal sector wages on the basis of hourly earnings. To distin-
guish between wages and pro￿ts for the independent workers, Headen (1990) suggests to
predict the returns to labor for the self-employed using wage estimations on employees.
Under the assumption of equal returns to labor for both dependent and independent work-
ers in the informal sector, the earnings gap between self-employed and informal employees
would give a measure of the returns to capital. It is obtained simply by comparing the
two estimated earnings gaps obtained in the paper (that is, relative to the formal sector).
This di⁄erence is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the bottom of the distribution,
which is consistent with little capital-intensive businesses in the lower-tier, and increases
gradually with earnings levels. At the top of the distribution, this di⁄erence amounts
to around 10% of the informal sector wages in Brazil, 20% in South Africa and 40% in
Mexico. Yet the assumption of equal returns to labor remains to be discussed. One may
also argue that similar corrections should be made for salary workers, i.e., adjusting wages
of salary workers for private investment in human capital. Finally, gross earnings gaps
could be corrected for income taxes and social contributions paid in the formal sector (as
in Badaoui et al., 2008, and Bargain and Kwenda, 2009) ￿yet informal self-employment
should be better identi￿ed for that purpose. Accounting for non-pecuniary advantages
attached to a particular sector, and above all for medical bene￿ts and pensions paid in
14the formal sector, represents a considerable challenge, given data limitation. Yet this is a
fundamental and necessary improvement for more comprehensive welfare analyses.11
References
[1] Albrecht, J.W., A van Vuuren and S. Vroman (2004): "Decomposing the gender wage
gap in the Netherlands with sample selection adjustments", forthcoming in labor
Economics
[2] Amuedo-Dorantes, C. (2004): ￿Determinants and Poverty Implications of Informal
Sector Work in Chile￿ , in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52(2),
349-368.
[3] Angrist, J., V. Chernozhukov and I. FernÆndez-Val (2006): "Quantile Regression
under Misspeci￿cation, with an Application to the U.S. Wage Structure", Econo-
metrica, 74(2), 539-563
[4] Arias, O. and M. Khamis (2008): "Comparative Advantage, Segmentation and In-
formal Earnings: A Marginal Treatment E⁄ects Approach", IZA DP No. 3916
[5] Arias, O., A. Blom, M. Bosch, W. Cunningham, A. Fiszbein, G. Lopez Acevedo, W.
Maloney, J. Saavedra, C. Sanchez-Paramo, M. Santamaria, Siga (2005): "Pending
issues in protection, productivity growth, and poverty reduction," Policy Research
Working Paper Series 3799, The World Bank.
[6] Aronson, R. L. (1991), Self-Employment: A Labor Market Perspective. Ithaca, N.Y.
ILR Press
[7] Badaoui, E. Strobl, E. and Walsh, F (2008): "Is There an Informal Employment
Wage Penalty? Evidence from South Africa", Economic Development and Cul-
tural Change, 56, 683￿ 710
[8] Bargain, O. and P. Kwenda (2009): "The informal wage gap - new evidence using
panel data", IZA working paper.
[9] Barros, R.P. and Corseuil, C.H. (2001): ￿The impact of regulations on Brazilian
labor market performance￿ , Research Network Working Paper No. R-427, Inter-
American Development Bank.
[10] Blau, D.M., (1985): "Self-employment and Self-Selection in Developing Country La-
bor Markets", Southern Economic Journal, 51, 2, 351-63
11For instance, see the discussion in Bourguignon et al. (2007) on the role of pensions on income
inequality in Brazil.
15[11] Blunch, N-H., S. Canagarajah., and D. Raju (2001): "The Informal Sector Revisited:
A Synthesis Across Space and Time", Social Protection Discussion Paper Series
No. 0119. Social Protection Unit Human Development Network The World Bank.
[12] Bosch and W. F. Maloney (2007): "Comparative Analysis of Labor Market Dynamics
Using Markov Processes: An Application to Informality," IZA Discussion Papers
3038, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[13] Bosch, M. and W. Maloney (2008): "Cyclical Movements in Unemployment and
Informality in Developing Countries", World Bank
[14] Bosch, M., E. Goni and W. Maloney (2007): "The Determinants of Rising Informality
in Brazil: Evidence from Gross Worker Flows", IZA Discussion Paper 2970
[15] Bourguignon, F., F. Ferreira and P. Leite (2007): "Beyond Oaxaca￿ Blinder: Ac-
counting for di⁄erences in household income distributions", Journal of Economic
Inequality.
[16] Canay, I. A. (2008): "A Note on Quantile Regression for Panel Data Models", De-
partment of Economics, Northwestern University
[17] Carneiro, F.G. and A. Henley (2001): "modeling formal vs informal employment and
earnings: microeconometric evidence for Brazil", Annals of the XXIX National
Meeting of Economics of ANPEC.
[18] Carrington, W. J., M. Kristin, and P. Brooks (1996): "The Role of Employer-
Employee Interactions in Labor Market Cycles: Evidence from the Self-
Employed", Journal of Labor Economics, 14 (4), 571-602
[19] Chandra, V., J. Nganou and C. Noel (2002): "Constraints to growth in Johannes-
burg￿ s black informal sector: Evidence from the 1999 informal sector survey",
World Bank Report No. 24449-ZA.
[20] Cichello, P.L., G.S. Fields, M. Leibbrandt (2005): "Earnings and Employment Dy-
namics for Africans in Post-apartheid South Africa: A Panel Study of KwaZulu-
Natal", Journal of African Economies, 1-48.
[21] Cunningham, W. and W.F. Maloney (2001): "Heterogeneity among Mexico￿ s mi-
croenterprises: an application of factor and cluster analysis", Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change, 50(1) 131-56.
[22] Devey, R., C. Skinner, and I. Valodia (2003): "Informal Economy Employment Data
in South Africa: A critical Analysis", Report prepared for the Employment Data
Research Group, Human Sciences Research Council.
16[23] Dickens, W. and K. Lang (1985): "A Test of the Dual labor Market Theory", Amer-
ican Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp.792-805
[24] Fields,G. S. (1975): "Rural-Urban Migration, Urban Unemployment and Underem-
ployment, and job search activity in LDCs" Journal of Development Economics,
Vol. 2, pp. 165-187.
[25] Fields,G. S. (2005): "A Guide to Multisector labor Markets Models", Paper prepared
for the World Bank labor Market Conference.
[26] Fields, G. S. (2006): "modeling labor market policy in developing countries: A
selective review of the literature and needs for the future", mimeo., December,
Cornell University.
[27] Funkhouser, E (1997): "Mobility and labor Market Segmentation: The Urban labor
Market in El Salvador", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 46,
No.1, pp.123-153
[28] Gong, X., A. van Soest, and E. Villagomez (2004): "Mobility in the urban labor
market: a panel data analysis for Mexico", Economic Development and Cultural
Change
[29] Gong, X. and A. van Soest (2002): "Wage di⁄erentials and mobility in the urban
labor market: a panel data analysis for Mexico", Labor Economics, Vol. 9, Issue
4, pp. 513-529
[30] Gonzalez, P.A. and Maloney, W. F (1999): "Logit analysis in a rotating panel context
and an application to self-employment decisions," Policy Research Working Paper
Series 2069, The World Bank
[31] G￿nther, I. and A. Launov (2007): "Competitive and Segmented Informal labor
Markets", IZA Discussion Papers 2349, Institute for the Study of labor (IZA).
[32] Hamilton, B.H. (2000) : "Does entrepreneurship pay? An empirical analysis of the
returns to self-employment", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.108 No.3, pp.
604-631.
[33] Henley, A., G.R. Arabsheibani, and F.G. Carneiro (2007): "On de￿ning and measur-
ing the informal sector", Policy research working paper 3866, World Bank.
[34] Hofmeyr, J.F. (2002): "The importance of segmentation in the South African labor
market", University of Natal.
[35] J￿tting, J., T. Xenogiani and J. Parlevliet (2007): "Work and Well-Being: Informal
employment revisited", OECD Development Centre
17[36] Kingdon, G., and Knight, J. (2001) ￿Why high open unemployment and small infor-
mal sector in South Africa?￿Centre for the Study of African Economies, Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Oxford, October 2001.
[37] Kingdon, G. and J. Knight (2007): ￿ Unemployment in South Africa, 1995-2003:
Causes, problems and policies￿ , Journal of African Economies, forthcoming.
[38] Koenker, R. (2004): ￿Quantile Regression for Longitudinal Data￿ , Journal of Multi-
variate Analysis, 91, 74-89.
[39] Leibenstein, H. (1968), "Entrepreneurship and Development", American Economic
Review, 58 72-83
[40] Leontaridi, M. (1998): ￿Segmented labor Markets: Theory and Evidence.￿Journal
of Economic Surveys 12(1): pp. 103￿ 109.
[41] Maloney, W. F. (1998a): "The structure of labor markets in developing countries:
Time series evidence on competing views. Working Paper 1940, World Bank,
Washington, DC
[42] Maloney, W. F. (1998b): "Are labor markets in developing countries dualistic?,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series 1941, The World Bank.
[43] Maloney,W.F. (1999): "Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban labor Mar-
kets? Evidence from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico", World Bank Economic
Review, Vol.13, No.3, pp.275-302
[44] Maloney,W.F. (2004): "Informality revisited", World Development, Vol 32 , No7,
pp.1159-78
[45] Marcouiller, D. and V. Ruiz de Castilla and C. Woodru⁄ (1997): "Formal Measures
of the Informal-Sector Wage Gap in Mexico, El Salvador, and Peru", Economic
Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, Vol. 45, No.2, pp
367-92.
[46] Menezes-Filho, N., N. Mendes, and E. Almeida (2004): "O diferencial de salarios
formal-informal no brasil: Segmenta￿ªo ou vies de sele￿ªo?", Revista Brasileira
de Economia 58 (2).
[47] Moro, S., F. Chein, and A. F. Machado (2003): "Self-employment in Brazil and
its determinants: a spatial analysis," Textos para Discussˆ£o Cedeplar-UFMG
td204, Cedeplar, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.
[48] Packard, T.G. G. (2007): "Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A
Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No. 4232.
18[49] Perry, G., W. Maloney, O. Arias, P. Fajnzylber, A. Mason, J. Saavedra-Chanduvi
(2006, eds.), Informality: Exit and Exclusion, World Bank latin America and
Caribbean Studies.
[50] Ru⁄er, T. and J. Knight (2007): "Informal sector labor markets in developing coun-
tries", University of Oxford
[51] Saavedra, J. and A. Chong (1999): "Structural reforms, institutions and earnings:
evidence from the formal and informal sectors in urban Peru", Journal of Devel-
opment Studies, 35(4), 95-116
[52] Sullivan, D.H. and T.M. Smeeding (1997): "All the World￿ s entrepreneurs: The Role
of Self-employment in Nineteen Nations", Luxembourg Income Study Working
Paper Series No.163
[53] Tannuri-Pianto, M.E. and D.M. Pianto (2002): "Informal Employment in Brazil ￿
A Choice at the Top and Segmentation at the Bottom: A Quantile Regression
Approach", Department of Economics Working Paper 236, University of Brasilia.
[54] Yamada, G. (1996) : ￿Urban Informal Employment and Self-employment in Devel-









































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 1: Distribution of Workers across Sectors
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Figure 2: Estimated Wage Gaps (Brazil)
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Figure 3: Estimated Wage Gaps (South Africa)
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Figure 4: Estimated Wage Gaps (Mexico)
The graphs represent the number of movers in % of the total number of transitions in the panels (including both stayers and movers-type of transitions). Quintiles are calculated on the basis of the period where workers are first
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Self-emp. <--> Form. Salary
Infor. Salary <--> Form. Salary
Infor. Salary <--> Self-empl.
Figure 5: Transitions across Employment States
21Panel A: Self-Employment Penalty/Premium Interacted with Age and Education
Panel B: Checking for Potential Asymmetries (Self-Employment Penalty/Premium)
Note: 95% confidence intervals represented by dashed lines (based on std errors obtained by bootstrapping).







































































































FE-QR (movers: formal to informal)













































































Self-emp. Earnings Gap (Pooled QR on attrition sample)
Inf. Sal. Earnings Gap (Pooled QR on attrition sample)
Self-emp. Earnings Gap (Baseline Pooled QR)
Inf. Sal. Earnings Gap (Baseline Pooled QR)
Figure 6: Extensions and Robustness Checks
22Table 1: Selected Samples: Descriptive Statistics



















Hourly gross earnings 4.79 3.79 6.39 2.54 1.06 1.79 2.78 2.02 3.82
Std dev. (6.97) (5.39) (10.76) (3.69) (1.71) (3.43) (0.50) (0.54) (0.75)
Demographics
Age 36.6 36.6 43.3 38.5 39.2 41.6 34.6 32.5 41.8
household size 3.8 3.9 3.7 5.9 6.4 7.7 4.6 4.9 4.5
# children (0-10 years) 3.2 3.9 3.2 1.7 2.2 2.7 1.8 1.6 2.6
Married 0.64 0.56 0.73 0.63 0.49 0.66 0.62 0.45 0.66
Black 0.07 0.07 0.06 Black 0.74 0.86 0.94
Brown 0.32 0.31 0.27 Coloured 0.26 0.14 0.06
White 0.61 0.61 0.67
Education
No Schooling 0.01 0.02 0.02 No schooling 0.09 0.15 0.09 No education 0.02 0.05 0.05
1-3 Years 0.04 0.06 0.06 Primary 0.31 0.40 0.33 1-3 Years 0.04 0.08 0.10
4-7 Years 0.24 0.31 0.29 Secondary 0.53 0.42 0.52 4-7 Years 0.24 0.34 0.34
8-10 Years 0.18 0.19 0.16 Vocational 0.07 0.03 0.05 8-10 Years 0.45 0.40 0.32
11+ Years 0.53 0.43 0.48 University 0.01 0.00 0.01 11+ Years 0.25 0.13 0.19
Region
Recife 0.06 0.05 0.05 Western Cape 0.21 0.10 0.06 >100,000 Inhab. 0.72 0.56 0.64
Salvador 0.07 0.06 0.07 Eastern Cape 0.09 0.16 0.12 15,000-99,999 Inhab. 0.11 0.16 0.15
Belo Horizonte 0.16 0.12 0.16 Northern Cape 0.08 0.05 0.02 2,500-14,999  Inhab. 0.08 0.14 0.12
Rio de Janeiro 0.27 0.32 0.31 Free State 0.11 0.07 0.09 < 2,500 Inhab. 0.08 0.13 0.10
Sao Paulo 0.25 0.29 0.24 Kwazulu-Natal 0.11 0.15 0.16
Porto Alegre 0.19 0.16 0.17 North West 0.11 0.13 0.10
Gauteng 0.12 0.12 0.17
Mpumalanga 0.10 0.10 0.15
Limpopo 0.05 0.12 0.14
Economic sector
Manufacturing 0.31 0.18 0.12 0.35 0.08 0.10 0.36 0.17 0.14
Construction 0.07 0.15 0.21 0.12 0.26 0.20 0.10 0.34 0.25
Trade & Retail 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.28 0.18 0.52 0.24 0.14 0.23
Services 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.33 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.27
Transport and Comm 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.11
#   panel observations 24,105 5,200 15,067 18,102 2,444 2,211 151,370 118,357 94,184
share of workers 54% 12% 34% 79% 11% 10% 42% 33% 26%
Statistics concern the selected sample of male aged 15-65, neither in education nor in the public sector. Data covers the period 2002-2007 for Brazil, 2001-2007 for South Africa and 2005-2008 for
Mexico. Hourly earnings in 2002 PPP international $.
23Table 2: Selected Samples: Multinomial Logit of Workers￿Status
Informal salaried Self-employed Informal salaried Self-employed Informal salaried Self-employed
Demographics Ref: white, single Ref: black, sinlge Ref:  sinlge
Age -0.141 (0.012) 0.121 (0.010) -0.072 (0.016) -0.021 (0.021) -0.106 (0.004) 0.138 (0.005)
Age squared 0.002 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000)
Married -0.340 (0.045) -0.044 (0.036) -0.510 (0.071) -0.114 (0.083) -0.524 (0.016) -0.260 (0.019)
Household size 0.068 (0.024) 0.008 (0.020) -0.049 (0.014) -0.062 (0.014) 0.035 (0.003) -0.014 (0.004)
# of children (0-10 years) -0.063 (0.027) -0.080 (0.022) 0.156 (0.027) 0.164 (0.029) -0.001 (0.004) 0.027 (0.005)
Black -0.170 (0.082) -0.445 (0.066) Coloured -0.291 (0.102) -0.857 (0.142)
Brown -0.105 (0.049) -0.334 (0.040)
Education Ref: no schooling Ref: no schooling Ref: no schooling
1-3 Years 0.142 (0.172) 0.006 (0.138) Primary -0.366 (0.093) -0.168 (0.139) 1-3 Years -0.298 (0.050) -0.175 (0.056)
4-7 Years 0.164 (0.154) 0.091 (0.122) Secondary -1.162 (0.101) -0.397 (0.146) 4-7 Years -0.574 (0.044) -0.378 (0.049)
8-10 Years 0.033 (0.158) 0.051 (0.125) Vocational -1.769 (0.175) -0.683 (0.201) 8-10 Years -0.995 (0.044) -0.662 (0.050)
11+ Years -0.280 (0.156) 0.153 (0.122) University -2.325 (1.003) -0.009 (0.693) 11+ Years -1.330 (0.046) -0.592 (0.051)
Economic Sector Ref: construction Ref: construction Ref: construction
Manufacturing -1.212 (0.068) -2.121 (0.057) -2.070 (0.111) -1.782 (0.122) -1.793 (0.020) -1.698 (0.025)
Trade & Retail -0.626 (0.068) -1.417 (0.055) 0.184 (0.107) -0.260 (0.138) -0.204 (0.025) -0.655 (0.030)
Services -0.771 (0.076) -1.313 (0.061) -0.027 (0.089) -1.086 (0.134) -1.438 (0.024) -1.022 (0.029)
Transport and Comm -0.437 (0.064) -0.674 (0.051) -1.136 (0.093) 0.119 (0.095) -0.495 (0.025) 0.083 (0.028)
Region Ref: Recife Ref: Western Cape Ref: >100,000 Inhab.
Salvador 0.007 (0.117) 0.051 (0.090) Eastern Cape 1.040 (0.121) 0.971 (0.171) 15,000-99,999 Inhab. 0.608 (0.021) 0.429 (0.024)
Belo Horizonte -0.086 (0.100) 0.050 (0.078) Northern Cape 0.147 (0.147) -0.145 (0.257) 2,500-14,999  Inhab. 0.789 (0.023) 0.624 (0.027)
Rio de Janeiro 0.286 (0.095) 0.039 (0.074) Free State 0.206 (0.146) 0.722 (0.189) < 2,500 Inhab. 0.550 (0.024) 0.346 (0.029)
Sao Paulo 0.428 (0.096) 0.030 (0.076) North West 0.692 (0.136) 0.609 (0.193)
Porto Alegre 0.033 (0.103) -0.067 (0.081) Gauteng 0.433 (0.135) 0.825 (0.176)
Mpumalanga 0.276 (0.142) 0.957 (0.181)
Limpopo 1.270 (0.151) 1.595 (0.196)
Kwazulu Natal 0.532 (0.134) 0.906 (0.175)
Constant 1.655 (0.294) -2.609 (0.256) 1.023 (0.363) -1.308 (0.462) 3.704 (0.079) -2.549 (0.100)
Pseudo-R2
Multinomial Logit with base outcome = being a formal salaried worker
Brazil South Africa Mexico
0.103 0.186 0.142
24Table 3: Conditional Earnings Gaps: Summary
coef. std.err. coef. std.err coef. std.err coef. std.err
Brazil
pooled OLS and QR
Informal Salaried -0.093 (0.011) -0.130 (0.008) -0.080 (0.014) -0.045 (0.016)
Informal Selfemployed 0.119 (0.010) -0.013 (0.011) 0.123 (0.009) 0.184 (0.013)
FE and FE-QR
Informal Salaried -0.052 (0.012) -0.078 (0.004) -0.046 (0.002) -0.024 (0.004)
Informal Selfemployed -0.002 (0.015) -0.060 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.057 (0.004)
South Africa
pooled OLS and QR
Informal sector -0.629 (0.024) -0.635 (0.030) -0.674 (0.027) -0.579 (0.024)
Informal Selfemployed -0.298 (0.032) -0.503 (0.051) -0.372 (0.042) -0.020 (0.027)
FE and FE-QR
Informal sector -0.213 (0.027) -0.322 (0.019) -0.203 (0.008) -0.116 (0.019)
Informal Selfemployed -0.151 (0.045) -0.407 (0.015) -0.141 (0.008) 0.120 (0.017)
Mexico
pooled OLS and QR
Informal Salaried -0.155 (0.003) -0.205 (0.003) -0.163 (0.002) -0.113 (0.003)
Informal Selfemployed 0.127 (0.004) -0.047 (0.003) 0.112 (0.002) 0.292 (0.003)
FE and FE-QR
Informal Salaried -0.038 (0.003) -0.082 (0.002) -0.038 (0.000) 0.004 (0.002)
Informal Selfemployed 0.161 (0.005) 0.017 (0.002) 0.161 (0.000) 0.303 (0.002)
Earnings gap = estimated coefficient of the informal salary /self employment dummy. All estimations based on the variables reported in the descriptive statistics, except
time-invariant characteristics (race, education and region) in the fixed effects estimations. Std. errors in brackets.
Mean Q=0.2 Q=0.5 Q=0.8
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Type of selfemployment Ref: selfemployed employers Ref: selfemployed employers Ref: selfemployed employers
Own account worker 0.372 (0.068) -0.129 (0.095) 0.832 (0.224) 0.343 (0.521) 0.243 (0.025) -0.459 (0.019)
Demographics Ref: white, single Ref: black, sinlge Ref:  sinlge
Age -0.088 (0.018) 0.356 (0.067) -0.053 (0.062) -0.001 (0.001) -0.056 (0.007) 0.026 (0.006)
Age squared 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.559) 0.001 (0.001) -0.031 (0.319) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Married -0.503 (0.059) 2.661 (0.503) -0.598 (0.236) 0.076 (0.529) -0.156 (0.028) 0.097 (0.022)
Household size 0.129 (0.032) -0.497 (0.155) 0.065 (0.064) 0.288 (0.172) -0.010 (0.007) -0.030 (0.005)
# of children (0-10 years) -0.116 (0.036) -0.718 (0.175) 0.015 (0.120) 1.176 (0.992) -0.006 (0.006) -0.001 (0.005)
Black 0.386 (0.099) 0.855 (0.504) Coloured -0.038 (0.731) -0.476 (0.468)
Brown 0.344 (0.065) 1.393 (0.507)
Education Ref: no schooling Ref: no schooling Ref: no schooling
1-3 Years -0.123 (0.159) 0.856 (0.118) Primary -0.396 (0.331) -0.217 (0.450) 1-3 Years -0.282 (0.060) 0.227 (0.058)
4-7 Years -0.431 (0.141) 0.858 (0.101) Secondary -0.864 (0.344) 0.897 (0.708) 4-7 Years -0.492 (0.053) 0.330 (0.052)
8-10 Years -0.818 (0.149) 1.100 (0.134) Vocational -0.685 (0.693) -31.377 (1.644) 8-10 Years -0.637 (0.055) 0.495 (0.053)
11+ Years -1.484 (0.150) 1.285 (0.108) University -32.073 (1.192) -0.022 (0.515) 11+ Years -0.777 (0.061) 0.721 (0.056)
Economic Sector Ref: construction Ref: construction Ref: construction
Manufacturing -0.132 (0.101) 0.571 (0.241) 0.065 (0.443) -0.242 (0.455) 1.747 (0.049) 0.021 (0.032)
Trade & Retail 0.066 (0.081) 0.634 (0.166) 0.464 (0.382) 0.244 (0.681) 1.598 (0.076) 0.096 (0.059)
Services -0.549 (0.116) 0.333 (0.140) -0.099 (0.558) -0.050 (0.790) 1.517 (0.067) 0.216 (0.049)
Transport and Comm -0.315 (0.107) -0.117 (0.136) 1.002 (0.566) -1.622 (1.108) 1.716 (0.051) 0.156 (0.033)
Occupation Ref: Professionals Ref: Professionals Ref: Professionals
Director -0.659 (0.254) 1.346 (0.159) 0.171 (0.771) 1.176 (0.992) 0.011 (0.137) 0.186 (0.082)
Service work 0.471 (0.174) -0.027 (0.152) 0.812 (0.598) 0.226 (0.681) 0.365 (0.080) -0.847 (0.057)
Elementary work 0.248 (0.186) -0.718 (0.175) 1.007 (0.586) 0.100 (0.689) 1.262 (0.184) -1.063 (0.246)
Other -0.220 (0.179) 0.096 (0.151) 0.407 (0.644) 0.418 (0.757) 0.690 (0.083) -0.899 (0.061)
Region Ref: Recife Ref: Western Cape Ref: >100,000 Inhab.
Salvador 0.239 (0.133) 0.103 (0.140) Eastern Cape 1.250 (0.981) -0.429 (0.892)15,000-99,999 Inhab. 0.334 (0.036) -0.161 (0.029)
Belo Horizonte -0.574 (0.115) -0.075 (0.040) Northern Cape -0.752 (1.390) -2.825 (1.253) 2,500-14,999  Inhab. 0.538 (0.037) -0.381 (0.033)
Rio de Janeiro -0.284 (0.108) 0.014 (0.043) Free State 0.981 (1.013) -0.496 (0.774) < 2,500 Inhab. 0.584 (0.041) -0.256 (0.037)
Sao Paulo -0.655 (0.117) 1.346 (0.159) North West 0.560 (1.024) -0.150 (0.673)
Porto Alegre -0.655 (0.122) -0.027 (0.152) Gauteng 0.801 (0.988) -1.121 (0.774)
Mpumalanga 0.658 (1.014) -1.796 (0.849)
Limpopo 0.707 (1.047) -0.801 (0.738)
Kwazulu Natal 0.710 (0.995) -0.088 (0.103)
Constant 1.640 (0.439) -5.497 (0.672) -1.716 (1.763) -4.218 (2.578) -1.407 (0.177) -0.425 (0.147)
Pseudo-R2
Multinomial Logit with base outcome = middle quintiles
Brazil South Africa Mexico
     Bottom Top      Bottom Top
0.239 0.122 0.070
     Bottom Top
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